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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Livingston J. Papse, Sr., appeals from his judgment for felony DUI. He challenges
his sentence, asserting for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor’s sentencing
arguments breached the plea agreement and also asserting the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Papse with felony DUI, with a persistent violator enhancement,
and misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R., pp. 52-57.) Papse pled guilty to felony
DUI pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the state dismissed the driving without
privileges charge and the enhancement and agreed to concur with the recommendation of
the presentence report. (7/18/17 Tr., p. 8, L. 20 – p. 9, L. 8.) The PSI recommended
retained jurisdiction, with no recommendation for an underlying sentence. (PSI, p. 13.) At
sentencing the defense recommended probation. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 20 – p. 9, L. 19.)
The prosecutor recommended a sentence of 10 years with three years determinate and
retained jurisdiction. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 10, L. 8 – p. 12, L. 12.) The district court imposed
a sentence of 10 years with six years fixed. (R., pp. 97-99.) Papse filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp. 105-06.)
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ISSUES
Papse states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the State breach the plea agreement when it made statements
that were fundamentally at odds with the recommendation it had
agreed to make?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence
of ten years, with six years fixed, following Mr. Papse’s guilty plea
to one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substance?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Papse failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s sentencing
argument?
2.

Has Papse failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Papse Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Sentencing Argument
A.

Introduction
The state agreed to concur with the recommendation of the presentence report.

(7/18/17 Tr., p. 8, L. 20 – p. 9, L. 8.) The PSI recommended the court retain jurisdiction,
with no recommendation for an underlying sentence. (PSI, p. 13.) Papse requested
probation. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 20 – p. 9, L. 19.) The prosecutor recommended that the
court retain jurisdiction with an underlying sentence of 10 years with three years
determinate. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-12; p. 12, Ls. 6-8.)
On appeal, for the first time, Papse asserts that the prosecutor’s sentencing
arguments breached the plea agreement. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-19.) Papse challenges
three statements by the prosecutor, which he claims are “fundamentally at odds” with the
expressed recommendation that the district court retain jurisdiction: (1) stating that the
presentence investigator’s recommendation of retained jurisdiction “is somewhat of a gift
to Mr. Papse, based on his history” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 13-16); (2) asking the rhetorical
question, “At what point does this individual place society at such risk that the only choice
is incarceration?” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-4); and (3) stating that Papse had “elected not
to [undergo treatment] in the past” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 9-11). (Appellant’s brief, pp.
6-19.) Papse has failed to show fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal, the standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson,
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147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to timely object at trial
to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside
for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245
P.3d 961, 980 (2010).
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection may only
be considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho
259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection “the appellate
court’s authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error
results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Review
without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that “one or more of
the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the constitutional error
is “clear or obvious” on the record, “without the need for any additional information”
including information “as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3)
the defendant demonstrates that “the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,”
generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error “affected the outcome of the
trial court proceedings.” Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. “The three-part test for unobjectedto fundamental error from Perry applies to claims of prosecutorial breach of a plea
agreement at sentencing.” State v. Merrill, 164 Idaho 233, 428 P.3d 811, 813 (Ct. App.
2018).
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C.

Papse Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
When the state breaches its obligation under a plea agreement to recommend a

specific sentence, it violates the defendant’s due process rights. Puckett v. United States,
556 U.S. 129, 136 (2009) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
“Although prosecutors need not use any particular form of expression in recommending an
agreed sentence, their overall conduct must be reasonably consistent with making such a
recommendation, rather than the reverse.” State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 165, 206
P.3d 867, 871 (Ct. App. 2009).

A prosecutor may make additional sentencing

recommendations so long as they are not inconsistent or incompatible with the plea
agreement. State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775, 102 P.3d 380, 382 (Ct. App. 2004). Further,
absent an agreement to the contrary, the prosecutor may refer to information relevant to
sentencing and refer to the objectives of sentencing. Id. The prosecution’s obligation to
recommend a sentence promised in a plea agreement does not carry with it the obligation
to make the recommendation enthusiastically. United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453,
455 (1985); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 302, 77 P.3d 988, 991 (Ct. App. 2003).
This case is indistinguishable from State v. Merrill, 164 Idaho 233, 428 P.3d 811
(Ct. App. 2018), and State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171, 280 P.3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012). In
Merrill the state agreed to concur with the recommendation of the PSI. 164 Idaho at ___,
428 P.3d at 814. In Stocks the state agreed to make a recommendation no harsher than in
the PSI. 153 Idaho at 172, 280 P.3d at 199. In both cases, as in this one, the prosecutor
made the agreed-upon recommendations but the appellants claimed for the first time on
appeal that the prosecutor also made arguments at sentencing “fundamentally at odds” with
the agreed recommendations. Merrill, 164 Idaho at ___, 428 P.3d at 816; see also Stocks,
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153 Idaho at 173, 280 P.3d at 200 (prosecutor’s arguments “impliedly breached the plea
agreement”). In both cases the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that the “requirement that a
violation be clear all but definitively defeats a claim of an implied violation of the type that
[the appellant] advances here.” Merrill, 164 Idaho at ___, 428 P.3d at 816; Stocks, 153
Idaho at 174, 280 P.3d at 201.
In this case the prosecutor made comments that Papse did not object to, but that on
appeal he claims impliedly breached the plea agreement. Because an implied breach is not
clear on the record, Papse’s claim fails on the first and second prongs of the fundamental
error test.
The claim also fails on the third prong. The district court specifically addressed the
rider recommendation in the PSI, but rejected it because Papse had a history of “choosing
to avoid rehabilitative measures.” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 18 – p. 16, L. 6.) As will be set
forth in more detail below, the record shows that the district court would not have retained
jurisdiction regardless of the prosecutor’s argument. Papse’s claim also fails on the third
prong of the fundamental error standard.
Papse argues that Merrill and Stocks were wrongly decided. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
10-17.) However, the reasoning of those cases is supported by both the existing law and
the record in this case. The prosecutor’s arguments were at best direct rebuttals of the
defense sentencing recommendation of probation (10/23/17 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 7-8) and therefore
proper or, at worst, not clearly a repudiation of the recommendation for retained
jurisdiction.
First, stating that the recommendation for retained jurisdiction for Papse’s eighth
felony conviction and fifth DUI conviction (10/23/17 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21-23) is analogous to
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a “gift” given Papse’s history (10/23/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 13-19) shows that the defense
recommendation of probation is unreasonable. Moreover, it seems self-evident that the
recommendation that Papse receive a retained jurisdiction on his eighth felony conviction
is very generous. Second, asking rhetorically at what point incarceration was necessary to
protect the community was proper, and not clearly a repudiation of the retained jurisdiction
recommendation.

Because retaining jurisdiction would involve incarceration while

probation would not, requesting incarceration over probation was entirely consistent with
the state’s recommendation and a proper counter to the defense probation recommendation.
Third, pointing out that Papse had refused to engage in rehabilitative programming, which
was spelled out in the PSI (PSI, p. 7) and had already been addressed in the hearing
(10/23/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 20 – p. 10, L. 5), was a proper reference to information relevant to
sentencing, and not a clear due process violation.
It is also not clear on the record that the lack of objection to any of these statements
was not a tactical decision by defense counsel. Counsel could have concluded, as the state
argues above, that the prosecutor’s comments (analogizing the recommendation of
probation to a “gift”; incarceration is necessary at some point to protect the community;
and that Papse had previously refused rehabilitative opportunities) were directed primarily
to the defense recommendation of probation. It is also conceivable that defense counsel
could have concluded that an objection would be ultimately futile given Papse’s
horrendous criminal and DUI history. Finding fundamental error under the circumstances
of this case can only encourage sandbagging in future, similar cases.
Even if Papse’s argument did not fail on the first two prongs of the fundamental
error test, it fails on the third, prejudice, prong. The district court found that Papse had

7

“ten misdemeanor convictions,” that this was his “eighth felony conviction,” and his “fifth
conviction for DUI.” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21-23.) Papse was in the “high risk
category” for re-offense. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls 16-17.) The district court stated that its
“problem” with the recommendation of a retained jurisdiction, which was based on the
analysis that Papse had not before received treatment for alcohol abuse, was that Papse
“chose to simply top [his] time out” and was “choosing to avoid rehabilitative measures.”
(10/23/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 14 – p. 16, L. 6.) The court stated it was “obvious” that “protection
of society is paramount, because [Papse] keep[s] getting behind the [wheel of a] vehicle
and driving under the influence, despite severe consequences and having served prison in
the past.” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 7-18.) Papse has failed to show a reasonable likelihood
that the district court would have retained jurisdiction but for the challenged statements of
the prosecutor.
Papse has shown none of the prongs of his fundamental error claim.

II.
Papse Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
As stated above, the district court based its decision to impose a sentence of 10

years with six years determinate on Papse’s horrendous record, high risk to reoffend,
avoidance of rehabilitative measures, and need to protect the community. (10/23/17 Tr.,
p. 14, L. 5 – p. 16, L. 24.) Papse argues the district court abused its discretion because the
sentence was “not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 19.)
Application of the correct legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“We review the length of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.” State

v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 273, 311 P.3d 283, 285 (2013) (internal quotation omitted).
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (internal quotation omitted). The Court
considers the defendant’s entire sentence, but presumes that the fixed portion of the
sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho
790, 367 P.3d 185, 189 (2016).
“A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objectives
of protecting society or the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution.” State v. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 267-68, 346 P.3d 279, 284-85 (2015) (internal
quotation omitted). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view
of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho
828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (internal quotation omitted). “Furthermore, a sentence
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse
of discretion by the trial court.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628
(2016) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
“We will defer to factual findings made by the lower court if supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record.” State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789,
948 P.2d 127, 144 (1997).
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C.

Papse Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion
The district court considered Papse’s criminal record: “You have ten misdemeanor

convictions. This is your eighth felony conviction. And this is your fifth conviction for
DUI.” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21-23.) The district court pointed out that Papse had
“chosen to sit out each of [his] prison sentences” rather than participate in treatment and
apply for parole, which indicated he was “choosing to avoid rehabilitative measures.”
(10/23/17 Tr., p. 14, L. 24 – p. 15, L. 3 (citing PSI, p. 7); p. 15, L. 18 – p. 16, L. 6 (citing
PSI, p. 13); see also p. 9, L. 20 – p. 10, L. 5.) The evaluation of Papse’s potential risk put
him “in the high-risk category.” (10/23/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 16-17.) The district court
considered the goals and objectives of sentencing and concluded a sentence of 10 years
with six years determinate was required to protect society. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 7-24.)
The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
Papse argues that the sentence of 10 years with six years determinate is “excessive
because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 19.)
None of his arguments support this claim.
Papse first claims that because he was 69 at sentencing “his sentence may amount
to a life sentence.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) A six year fixed sentence is not the equivalent
of a life sentence. Even if it were, Papse’s age is not mitigating.
Papse next argues that his 54-year history of alcoholism is mitigating. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 20.) This district court rejected the idea that it could protect the community by
addressing Papse’s alcohol abuse. (E.g., 10/23/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-6.) The record supports
that conclusion.
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Papse next argues he is not well educated and may be cognitively impaired.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) He does not explain why this would lead to a conclusion that
his sentence is not excessive and none is readily apparent.
Finally, Papse argues that the recommendation for retained jurisdiction would give
him the opportunity to address his alcoholism in a way incarceration in the past has not.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.) The district court rejected this recommendation because
Papse had chosen to avoid rehabilitative measures in the past. (10/23/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 46.) Papse has not claimed clear error in this determination. Papse has failed to show that
the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Papse’s judgment.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of January, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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